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Nevertheless, there remains a genuine controversy concerning the
interpretation of § 2113.
DAVID H. ALDRICH
V. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Federal Common Law for Water Pollution Nuisance
Abatement Confined To Interstate Controversies
A public nuisance, such as the pollution of a stream,' is a "low
grade common law offense"' which involves interference with a right
common to the general public.3 The conclusion reached in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins,4 that there is no general federal common law, seemingly
halted the application of any such substantive common law for public
nuisance abatement in federal courts.5 Nevertheless, when situations
arose which demanded an application of a federal common law stan-
dard based on compelling national interests,' the federal courts
adopted a "specialized" federal common law for interstate water pol-
lution abatement.7 In Committee for the Consideration of the Jones
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 U. VA. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser].
2 Id. at 999.
Id. The right to abate a public nuisance traditionally belongs to the state. But
see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05 (West Cum. Supp. 1976). However, where a nuisance
causes a particular injury or damage sufficiently distinguishable in kind and degree
from the injury to the general public, a private individual can adjudicate the abate-
ment of the nuisance. A particular injury or damage occurs when a nuisance substan-
tially interferes with the use or enjoyment of an individual's rights in land. Prosser,
supra note 1, at 1018.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
One national interest around which federal common law developed was the
abatement by a state of extraterritorial pollution. This common law was established
prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), where the Supreme Court held that industrial air pollution
originating in Tennessee and damaging the peach crop in Georgia gave rise to a cause
of action under federal common law. The Court had explained in Missouri v. Illinois,
200 U.S. 496 (1906), that such a federal remedy was established to remove a casus belli
or justification for war by providing for peaceful abatement of extraterritorial pollu-
tion. This reasoning was reaffirmed and adopted by the Court in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), a post-Erie case. In Illinois, the Court cited the Georgia
and Missouri decisions as establishing a basis for the federal common law. 406 U.S. at
104-07.
1 Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964).
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Falls Sewage System v. Train,I the Fourth Circuit held that the mere
existence of a national interest in pollution free navigable waters does
not justify the extension of a specialized federal common law to an
entirely intrastate pollution controversy.
The Committee, an association of Maryland neighborhood and
community organizations,9 instituted a suit seeking injunctive relief'0
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972." The complaint alleged that the Jones Falls Sewage Plant was
violating the Act by discharging excess sewage' 2 into Jones Falls
stream without a permit.' 3 The Maryland city officials responsible for
the operation of the sewage plant" thereafter filed a permit applica-
tion'" which, under the 1972 Act, sanctioned any discharge during the
permit processing period. 6 When a permit was eventually issued, the
539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
The plaintiff association was comprised of members of the Maryland residential
communities through which the Jones Falls stream flows. Id. at 1007.
20 Plaintiffs sought an order restraining the defendants from allowing any addi-
tional hook-ups into the Jones Falls Sewage System. They also sought to compel the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to perform his non-
discretionary duties to abate the pollution. Committee for the Consideration of Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train, 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (D. Md. 1974), af'd, 539 F.2d
1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as the '72 Act]. The
'72 Act establishes a private citizen cause of action under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp.
V 1975) which provides in pertinent part:
[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such standard
or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Administrator.
2" More than three million gallons of raw sewage entered the Jones Falls stream
from the sewage facility. 539 F.2d at 1010.
11 539 F.2d at 1007. Jones Falls Stream is a tributary of the Patapsco River which
flows through Baltimore Harbor into the Chesapeake Bay. Under the expansive inter-
pretation of the EPA, a tributary of a navigable river qualifies as "navigable waters."
40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p)(2) (1976); see United States v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 480 F.2d
616 (4th Cir. 1973).
1 The Jones Falls sewage plant comprised a portion of the City of Baltimore and
Baltimore County sewage systems. 375 F. Supp. at 1149. Political subdivisions qualify
as citizens of their respective states. Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118
(1868); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1961).
2 375 F. Supp. at 1150.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part:
Until December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit for discharge has
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Committee's allegation of a permit violation would no longer support
a cause of action under the Act. 7 Faced with summary dismissal, the
Committee amended its complaint to allege a cause of action under
the federal common law of public nuisance."
The Supreme Court has recently reviewed the federal common
law for pollution nuisance abatement which formed the basis of the
Committee's amended complaint. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,9
the State of Illinois2 alleged that the City of Milwaukee 2' was pollut-
been applied for pursuant to this section, but final administrative
deposition of such application has not been made, such discharge shall
not be a violation of (1) section 1311, 1316, or 1342 of this title or (2)
section 407 of this title [River and Harbor Act of 1899] . . . . For the
180-day period beginning on October 18, 1972, in the case of any point
source discharging any pollutant. . . immediately prior to such date
which source is not subject to section 407 of this title, the discharge
by such source shall not be a violation of this chapter if such source
applies for a permit . . .within such 180-day period.
The district court in Jones Falls interpreted this section to provide the defendant
polluters with immunity from suit under the '72 Act. 375 F. Supp. at 1151. The court
additionally found that the alleged pollution was not subject to the River and Harbor
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). This Act made unlawful the deposit of any
refuse matter in navigable waters but did not prohibit the deposit of refuse matter
flowing from "streets and sewers", passing in liquid form into any navigable waters.
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Although the River and Harbor Act gained sweeping import-
ance when the Supreme Court interpreted refuse matter to include all industrial pollu-
tants, see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966), this interpretation
does not negate the specific exception which removed the Jones Falls sewage from
coverage under the 1899 Act. See D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 285-
301 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ZWICK]. The Jones Falls district court also held that
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (k) (Supp. V 1975) does not require permit application within the
180-day period immediately following October 18, 1972 in order for the applicant to
qualify for immunity. The court declared that such an interpretation would contradict
that portion of the section which states "in any case where a permit . . . has been
applied for" immunity is granted. 375 F. Supp. at 1152.
"7 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975) provides in part: "Compliance with a permit
issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance for purposes of [33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (Supp. V 1975)]." See note 11 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 1008.
g 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
The suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (1970) invoking the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction arising out of a controversy between two states. U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 2. The Court, in denying original jurisdiction, declared that a federal
common law pollution abatement suit qualified as a controversy arising under the
"laws" of the United States. Id. at 99-101. This holding made a suit under the federal
common law a valid claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)(1970) which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. . . and arises under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States."
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ing Lake Michigan in violation of the federal common law of nuis-
ance." The Court held that the extraterritorial 3 pollution of Illinois'
interstate or navigable waters qualified as a matter of federal concern
which justified the application of a federal common law for the abate-
ment of the nuisance. 4 The issue presented in Jones Falls was
whether a similar federal question 25 cause of action may arise if the
alleged pollution did not have an extraterritorial effect but rather
involved solely intrastate pollution of a state's navigable waters. 6
21 The suit was brought against four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission
of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County
of Milwaukee. 406 U.S. at 93.
" The complaint alleged that some two hundred million gallons of raw or inade-
quately treated sewage were being discharged daily into Lake Michigan, an interstate
and navigable body of water. Id.
2 The extraterritorial nature of the pollution of Lake Michigan was not raised in
the Court's actual holding in the case. 406 U.S. at 99. The Court's opinion, however,
extensively discussed the creation of an "interstate" common law rather than a general
federal common law for water pollution abatement. 406 U.S. at 105-06. This disparity
in the Court's holding with its opinion formed the basis for the dissenting opinion in
the Jones Falls controversy. See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra.
21 406 U.S. at 99.
2 See note 20 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 1007. Another issue presented in Jones Falls but not addressed by
the Fourth Circuit was whether the Committee qualified as the representative of a
person or class of persons suffering a particular damage sufficiently different in kind
and degree from the general public. See note 3 supra. This issue involves an analysis
of the adversary nature of the litigants. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2. The Supreme Court
held in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), that an association did not have
standing to sue if no member had standing to sue as an individual. Sierra Club in-
volved the attempt of an environmental group to enjoin the development of a wilder-
ness area. Since no member claimed to use the area, the Club was held to have no
standing. In a more recent case, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), a
standing was established when the association alleged that its members would be
harmed individually by the ecological effects of increased freight rates for recyclable
materials. This issue was not addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Jones Falls because
the court found that no cause of action existed for any particular individual under the
federal common law. However, in another recent Fourth Circuit decision, the court
decided that an association of citizens similar to the committee in Jones Falls might
qualify for standing when a valid cause of action does exist.
In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976), a citizens associa-
tion (VFD) was created to facilitate the abatement of noise and air pollution from jet
aircraft at Washington National Airport. VFD brought suit alleging that the failure of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to file an environmental impact statement
concerning substantial changes in the air traffic distribution between National Airport
and Dulles International Airport violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). The court found that members of VFD were
adversely affected in their use of areas near these airports because of the alleged FAA
violation of NEPA. 541 F.2d at 444. The Fourth Circuit, applying United States v.
1977]
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The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the specialized common law
reflects the traditional "flexibility and capacity for adaptation"
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), found that the complaint sufficiently established the
association's standing to sue.
Virginians for Dulles is important because it identifies federal agency actions and
projects which will require environmental impact statements under the non-retroactive
NEPA. Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1972). Cf. United States v.
Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970) (retroactive effect of federal tax statute). Under
NEPA, detailed impact statements must be completed by all federal agencies propos-
ing "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (1970). Agencies have traditionally had two difficulties in
determining the applicability of this requirement. First, when does a project commenc-
ing prior to NEPA, but which has continued long after its enactment and vastly
expanded in scope, give rise to an impact statement requirement; and second, what
qualifies as a major federal action. See Kiser v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va.
1972).
In Virginians for Dulles, the FAA authorized the development of National and
Dulles airports prior to the enactment of NEPA. The recent actions of the FAA in-
cluded a 1972 budget allotment of twenty-six million dollars for the modernization of
National Airport. 541 F.2d at 445. The FAA also forecasted a dramatic increase in the
annual number of passengers utilizing these airports during the period 1972-1980. The
agency asserted that prior commencement exempted this airport development from
impact statement preparation.
The Fourth Circuit, in deciding Virginians for Dulles, provided federal agencies
with three clear indices for determination of an environmental impact statement re-
quirement. First, the agency must categorize the proposal as an ongoing or continuing
project. 541 F.2d at 446. A project with no fixed termination date and which was
intended to continue indefinitely is a continuing project. Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp.
389 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Ongoing projects are federal actions which have definite termina-
tion dates. The court held that a continuing project such as National Airport moderni-
zation almost certainly required impact statement preparation since it entailed a series
of major federal actions. 541 F.2d at 446. An ongoing project could require an impact
statement depending on the last two indices announced by the court. Second, the
agency must evaluate the stage of completion of the project and determine whether
alternatives to the current ongoing or continuing action are still economically feasible.
Id. at 445. Since the National Airport development was easily transferable to Dulles
Airport development, the court held that alternatives still existed for FAA impact
statement evaluation. Id. at 446-47. Finally, the size of the project is measured to
determine if it qualifies as a major federal action. Id. at 445. The court indicated that
an annual budget in excess of twenty-six million dollars clearly constituted major
action. Id. at 446.
Virginians for Dulles has already had a marked influence on impact statement
preparation within the FAA. Within two months of the Fourth Circuit decision the
FAA proposed an internal policy order change whereby an impact statement require-
ment arises despite project commencement prior to the enactment of NEPA. Proposed
FAA Order 1050.1B, Policies and Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts
§ 403, 41 Fed. Reg. 34222 (1976). The Fourth Circuit's strict interpretation and finely
defined indices of pre-NEPA projects which do not require impact statements is
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which marks the application or extension of the common law.27 The
common law for pollution nuisance abatement employed in Illinois
was appropriate for the factual situation presented in that contro-
versy. If, however, the factual situation is varied, as it was in Jones
Falls, the court must be certain that the reasons justifying previous
application of the common law continue to exist under any changed
circumstances. The Fourth Circuit in Jones Falls found that the in-
trastate nature of the pollution altered the factual situation suffi-
ciently to remove the controversy from an application of the federal
common law for interstate pollution abatement.2 The court further
concluded that a second factual variation, the passage of the 1972
Act, precluded the creation of a new federal common law for intra-
state pollution abatement because the Act negated the compelling
nature of the national interest in pure navigable waters.
2
1
The court's analysis focused on the compelling nature of the na-
tional interest which precipitates the creation of a specialized federal
common law. The Fourth Circuit held that the federal common law
represents an accommodation of competing state and national inter-
ests.20 The majority opinion identified such an accommodation in the
Supreme Court's Illinois decision.3' Wisconsin, the state which con-
equally applicable to all federal agencies. This decision may well make environmental
impact statement preparation an unequivocable statutory requirement rather than a
discretionary agency duty.
2 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884). The common law is not static
law mechanically applied by the federal courts but rather is a dynamic and growing
body of law developed by the courts. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants
Ass'n., 128 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1942). Courts applying.such common law are not
bound to perpetuate this law when, under varying circumstances, the law is found to
be neither "wise nor just." Id. at 649, citing Funk v. United States, 290 US. 371, 383
(1933).
539 F.2d at 1010.
Id. at 1009. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
Id. at 1008-09. The accomodation of the state interest is necessitated by the
interstitial nature of the federal powers. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. Federal common law
must be exercised "against the background of the total corpusjuris of the states" and
only when a federal interest is encroached upon by a state interest. Monaghan,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 11 (1975), citing P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 471 (2d ed. 1973).
31 539 F.2d at 1009. See Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). In Pankey,
ranchers in New Mexico were using a pesticide which was polluting interstate and
navigable waters flowing into Texas. The court applied federal common law to abate
this extraterritorial nuisance. The Tenth Circuit found the objective of vesting such
jurisdiction in the federal courts was to avoid the partiality or suspicion of partiality
which might exist if Texas was compelled to resort to the courts of the state where the
polluters were residents. See Note, State Ecological Rights Arising Under the Federal
Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 597.
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doned the pollution, had the sovereign right to police the criminal
offenses of its citizens.32 Offsetting this right was the "quasi-
sovereign" right of the state adversely affected by such pollution to
abate an extraterritorial nuisance.? The compelling national interest
in averting any forceful settlement of these conflicting state rights
permitted the federal court to apply federal common law for public
nuisance abatement. 4 Jones Falls, a controversy arising between two
Maryland residents, did not present a conflict of state's rights; there-
fore, the federal common law of interstate pollution could not be
applied.? Approaching the extension of federal common law into an
intrastate situation with traditional flexibility, the Fourth Circuit
assessed the compelling nature of the federal interest presented by
the Committee. The court found a federal interest clearly established
in the maintenance of the purity of navigable waters."6 In the court's
assessment, however, the national interest did not outweigh the sov-
ereign right of Maryland to settle a pollution controversy arising be-
tween two of its citizens.
37
The 1972 Act formed the basis of this assessment. First, the court
looked to the Act and found a congressional declaration that the right
of the states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution was primary
and not secondary to any federal interest in abatement.3 1 Second, the
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a court, in formulating common
law, is seizing legislative initiative in an area where Congress,
through the passage of adequate legislation like the 1972 Act, has
reduced the compelling nature of the federal interest.3 9 Thus, the 1972
Act, which legitimizes pollution up to certain federally acceptable
effluent limits,4" proscribes the need for an extension of judicial law
" U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972). See Texas v. Pankey, 441
F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971).
" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972). See Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971).
539 F.2d at 1009.
Congress declared the federal interest in water purity in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
7 539 F.2d at 1009.
Id. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (Supp. V 1975).
' Id. The federal judiciary plays a secondary role in the formation of federal policy
in most areas. The secondary role is assigned as part of the doctrine of the separation
of powers whereby the primary initiative for the exercise of the lawmaking powers is
reserved to the Congress. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules
of Decision, 77 HAzv. L. REV. 1084 (1964). See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 401 U.S.
91, 107 (1972).
" See Environmental Law, Section B, text accompanying notes 9-17 infra.
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based on the identical interest. Without a sufficiently compelling
national interest vis-a-vis Maryland's sovereign interest, the Fourth
Circuit found that the federal common law could not extend to this
controversy."
The Fourth Circuit decision is susceptible to criticism on two
grounds. First, as the dissenting opinion of Judge Butzner asserts, the
court does not properly acknowledge the holding of the Supreme
Court in Illinois.2 In that case, the Court held that a federal common
law cause of action for pollution abatement extends specifically to the
pollution of navigable waters.13 The Court also declared that federal
rather than state law must control the regulation of pollution in such
waters." Strictly applied, the Supreme Court holding creates a fed-
eral common law cause of action for intrastate pollution since the
pollution can occur in navigable waters. This federal cause of action,
in view of the Illinois Court's declaration, must control any estab-
lished state common law remedy for pollution abatement.1
5
The initial criticism of the majority's reading of Illinois is itself
assailable since it controverts the firmly established principle of a
case by case approach to the common law. The Illinois opinion in-
cluded a discussion of the interstate pollution which gave rise to an
application of the federal common law.4" Jones Falls, however, pre-
sented the significantly different factual situation of intrastate pollu-
tion. Therefore, the dissent's mechanical application of the Illinois
common law to Jones Falls would deprive the common law of its
traditional flexibility and capacity for growth. 7
539 F.2d at 1010.
J2 Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train,
539 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
406 U.S. at 99.
" In the Illinois declaration of the controlling nature of federal law, the federal
law referred to was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 155
(1948) as amended Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat.
498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75
Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water
Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753,80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818. This Act has been, for all practical
purposes, replaced by the 1972 Act. See McThenia, An Examination of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 195, 202
(1973) [hereinafter cited as McThenia].
Is The assumption necessary to reach the conclusion that federal common law for
pollution abatement controls conflicting state law, is that the Illinois declaration of
federal supremacy over state law was not limited to legislative enactments such as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act but also extended to judicially promulgated com-
mon law. See note 44 supra.
11 406 U.S. at 103-07.
,7 See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
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The second criticism of the majority opinion is that it strictly
limits the availability of a cause of action under the federal common
law of nuisance to interstate pollution controversies." This restriction
of the federal common law to interstate controversies is analogous to
the restrictive regulatory approach found in the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act49 which limited that Act's scope of control to inter-
state waters." Congress specifically rejected this restrictive jurisdic-
tional approach when it adopted the 1972 Act, which expanded fed-
eral statutory measures of pollution control to all navigable waters.'
This congressional exercise of power, in an area where state law was
declared primary, 2 seemingly elevates the federal interest in pure
navigable waters to a level which contradicts the Jones Falls court's
accommodation of the state interest over the federal interest. The
Fourth Circuit addressed this criticism with an evaluation of the
preemptive effect a federal statute has on a federal court's ability to
create a new body of federal common law. Hypothesizing an exten-
sion of the federal common law to intrastate pollution controversies,
the court noted that pollution legitimized by the 1972 Act could
feasibly be proscribed by judicial decision .53 This contradiction of the
1' The Fourth Circuit's holding that there is no federal common law cause of
action in intrastate navigable water pollution situations prohibits federal judicial reso-
lution of controversies arising in the estimated 20,000 water bodies classified as naviga-
ble waters unless such waters pass over a state border. Therefore, no federal common
law can exist in areas such as Alaska, Hawaii and other coastal states where intrastate
waters flow directly into the sea. See ZWICK, supra note 16, at 267-68; McThenia, supra
note 44 at 200 n.17.
" See note 44 supra.
so The Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5, 79 Stat. 907-08, pro-
vided:
If the Governor of a State . . . files . . . a letter of intent that such
State . . . will . . . adopt . . . water quality criteria applicable to
interstate water . . . such State criteria . . . shall thereafter be the
water quality standards applicable to such interstate water ....
If a State does not . . . file a letter of intent . . . the Administrator
may. . . prepare regulations setting forth standards of water quality
to be applicable to interstate waters . . . . (emphasis added)
See ZWICK, supra note 16, at 267-68; McThenia, supra note 44 at 199-200; Zener, The
Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 789-90 (Dolgin
& Guilbert, eds. 1974).
51 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
52 See text accompanying note 38 supra. See generally, Note, Effective National
Regulation of Point Sources Under the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act: The
Double Burden of Legislative Draftsmanship and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REv. 983,
987-97 (1976).
13 539 F.2d at 1009.
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constitutional allocation of power between the legislative and judicial
* branches of government" reinforced the Fourth Circuit's finding that
no compelling interest existed justifying the creation of a federal
common law for intrastate pollution abatement."
The Fourth Circuit's evaluation of the effect of the 1972 Act on a
federal court's ability to establish federal common law could have far-
reaching implications for the federal common law concerning inter-
state water pollution nuisance abatement. The court declared that
one factor which prohibits a federal common law remedy in intrastate
pollution controversies is that pollution, lawful under federal legisla-
tion, should not be declared unlawful under federal common law.
This same prohibiting factor can exist in the Illinois factual situation;
extraterritorial pollution which is lawful under the 1972 Act might be
proscribed under the common law. The Illinois Court was not con-
fronted with the situation of applying a common law remedy to pollu-
tion legitimized by statute since the then existing Federal Water
Pollution Control Act 6 did not contain the highly structured regula-
tory scheme of the 1972 Act.57 The importance afforded this possible
constitutional contradiction when compared to the federal interest in
averting any forceful abatement of extraterritorial pollution", will
determine the vitality of the Illinois interstate common law. Dicta in
the Illinois decision that future legislation might preempt the federal
common law 9 seemingly indicates the receptiveness of the Court to
an argument that the 1972 Act removes the necessity for a federal
common law for pollution nuisance abatement.
Jones Falls presented the Fourth Circuit with an intrastate pollu-
tion controversy that demanded resolution of an unprecedented com-
mon law issue." The court, with its cautious conclusion that no fed-
5' See note 39 supra.
Id. at 1010.
s, See note 50 supra.
5 See Environmental Law, Section B, text accompanying notes 5-16 infra.
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
5' The Illinois Court noted:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may
in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But
until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise
the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water
pollution.
406 U.S. at 107.
" See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (intrastate pollu-
tion issue avoided by electing to apply federal statute rather than introduce federal
common law with no interstate controversy); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United
States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975) (private citizen intervening in inter-
1977] . 599
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eral common law for intrastate pollution exists, avoided an expansion
of the common law which might have flooded federal courts with
patently state controversies. This finding also averts a holding which
would have necessitated a decision of the important issue concerning
the preemptive effect of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 on a federal common law for intrastate pollution
abatement. The Jones Falls decision, therefore, leaves for future liti-
gation arising in interstate pollution controversies the difficult issue
of the preemptive effect of the 1972 Act on federal common law.
B. Adjudicatory Hearing Required for NPDES Permit Issuance
The procedures necessary for the issuance of the federal pollution
discharge permit which caused the dismissal of the original com-
plaint in Jones Falls' formed the basis for another recent Fourth
Circuit decision. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 19722 establish a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) 3 which requires polluters to obtain a permit for the
discharge of any pollutant in the nation's navigable waters., The 1972
Act requires that such permits be issued only after an opportunity for
a public hearing has been afforded all interested parties.5 This statu-
tory requirement for a hearing, however, operates only when substan-
tive issues are presented which establish a necessity for such a hear-
state controversy); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Vt.), af'd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973) (interstate pollution gives rise to cause of action
under federal common law); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp.,
356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (state cannot allege violation of state common law in
federal district court).
Environmental Law, Section A, text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
2 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
3 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975).
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes
regulations which set forth the effluent limitations allowable for various categories of
point source pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b) (Supp. V 1975). Federal control and
reduction or elimination of this pollution is accomplished by a two step process
whereby any discharge of a pollutant is first declared unlawful. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a)
(Supp. V 1975). The second step entails the permit application process where the EPA
authorizes certain pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345 (Supp. V 1975). The Administra-
tor, through his power to prescribe the conditions of these permits, can assure and plan
for the attainment and maintenance of the water quality standards established under
the '72 Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
1 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part: "The Admin-
istrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants. ...
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ing. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 7
the Fourth Circuit held that an applicant's challenge of a permit
issued for a shorter period of time than requested raised an issue that
demanded a hearing.8
Consolidation Coal applied for an NPDES permit requesting au-
thorization to discharge pollutants, produced by the operation of a
bituminous coal mine, into a navigable stream. 9 The EPA, after for-
mulating the terms of the permit, 0 forwarded the application to the
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for state cer-
tification." The DNR, mindful of the more stringent federal effluent
limitations which were to be imposed approximately three years after
the effective date of Consolidation Coal's permit, 2 certified a permit
6 The Supreme Court has held that despite a statutory declaration of an individ-
ual's right to a full hearing, Congress never intended any agency "to waste time on
applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing." Denver Union Stock Yard
Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n., 356 U.S. 282, 287 (1958), citing United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956). In Denver Union, a provi-
sion of the Packers and Stockyard Act, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1970), provided for a
full hearing on a claim charging unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory practices in
furnishing regulated stockyard services. 7 U.S.C. § 211 (1970). Since the charge levied
against Denver Union Stock Yard Company did not allege any discrimination or unrea-
sonable denial of stockyard services, the Court held that the denial of an evidentiary
hearing was justifiable under the particular circumstances of the suit. 356 U.S. at 288.
7 537 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1239. The Fourth Circuit was exercising jurisdiction under the '72 Act's
direct statutory review provision. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (b)(1)(F) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Review of the Administrator's action.
(F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342 of this title
[33 U.S.C. § 1342], may be had by any interested person in the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial
district in which such person resides or transacts such business upon
application of such person.
This direct appeal to the court of appeals removes any necessity for jurisdiction
granted by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). Provisions
of that Act offer judicial review to any person "suffering legal wrong because of an
agency action," but does not apply if there are other adequate judicial remedies. See
Note, Judicial Review under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972: Which Federal Court?, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 745 (1976).
1 The permit application was made on April 15, 1973. A permit was ultimately
issued on July 31, 1974. 537 F.2d at 1237-38.
,0 Under the '72 Act the permit terms must assure compliance with federal ef-
fluent limitations established by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
" Id. Section 1341 (a)(1) provides that any applicant for a permit must obtain
state certification of the proposed pollution. The section also provides: "No license or
permit shall be granted if certification has been denied by the state. . . ." Thus, state
certification is a condition precedent to federal permit issuance. But see note 19 infra.
12 The '72 Act establishes July 1, 1977 as the target date for the achievement of
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limited to a two year period so that the state might have ample
opportunity to reevaluate the feasibility of attaining the more strin-
gent federal limitations.' 3 Upon receipt of this state certification, the
EPA permit was limited to a two year period." Consolidation Coal
made a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing before the EPA
seeking to lengthen the permit to the maximum statutory period of
five years.'5 The EPA denied the request, indicating that under the
provisions of the Act, the agency was powerless to issue a five year
permit without state certification. 6 The subsequent denial of a hear-
ing before the West Virginia Water Resources Board 7 led Consolida-
tion Coal to seek judicial review of the EPA action of issuing the
permit without a hearing.
Consolidation Coal contested the EPA's restrictive interpretation
of the 1972 Act's requirement for state certification of NPDES per-
mits and sought a hearing on the grounds that the EPA was not
absolutely bound by what Consolidation Coal termed a state recom-
mendation of a two year permit.'" The Fourth Circuit avoided inter-
pretation of EPA regulations'9 by deciding the controversy in terms
the national objective of more stringent limitation of pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)
(Supp. V 1975). The Fourth Circuit in Committee for the Consideration of Jones Falls
Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (4th Cir. 1976), identified this timeta-
ble stating: "[The '72 Act's] ultimate objective is the elimination of all water pollu-
tion. Purity however, is not to be achieved instantaneously. Instead the Act establishes
a series of steps which impose progressively stricter standards. .. ."
'1 537 F.2d at 1237. West Virginia envisioned a possible statewide revision of
permits during 1976 so as to enable the state to achieve the 1977 water quality stan-
dards. See note 12 supra. The state's justification for requesting such a two year limit
is lessened by the '72 Act which provides that any permit: ". ..can be terminated or
modified for cause including, but not limited to, the following: .. .iii) change in any
condition that requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of
the permitted discharge .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(3), (b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
Under this provision any five year permit could be modified to achieve the 1977 stan-
dards; however, the state would not be afforded another opportunity to certify the
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
" 537 F.2d at 1238.
,6 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342 (a)(3), (b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
, See note 11 supra.
'7 The Water Resources Board is the Department of Natural Resources division
responsible for state permit certification. W. VA. CODE § 20-5-1 (1973).
" 537 F.2d at 1238.
" The EPA asserted that state certification is a condition precedent to NPDES
permit issuance. See note 11 supra. Accepting this interpretation of the '72 Act, Con-
solidation Coal contended that the '72 Act does not specify the substantive provisions
or conditions within the EPA tentative permit which require such certification. The
EPA denied a hearing, declaring that the duration of a permit is one of the conditions
subject to mandatory state certification. Consolidation Coal challenged this determi-
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of the due process of law afforded Consolidation Coal. The court
found Consolidation Coal frustrated in every attempt to present its
objection to the two year duration of the permit." On the federal
level, the EPA refused to grant a hearing. On the state level, a West
Virginia Attorney General's opinion precluded state agency review of
the permit.2' This denial of any state administrative review by the
Board also eliminated state judicial review since court access was
predicated on an adverse administrative order made by the Water
Resources Board after an appeal hearing.22 The Fourth Circuit held
that the administrative and state judicial lockout violated Consolida-
tion Coal's constitutional right to an opportunity for a meaningful
and appropriate hearing preceding final administrative action.2
Consolidation Coal clearly reaffirms the fundamental due process
requirement that federal agencies cannot act without affording a per-
nation since EPA regulations establishing procedures for the implementation of the '72
Act treated the duration of the permit as a factor not requiring state certification. 40
C.F.R. § 125.25 (b) (1976) provides: "Permits of less than five years duration may issue
in appropriate cases and Regional Administrators shall give great weight to the advice
of State. . .officials on the appropriate duration for particular permits." This use of
the state advice on the duration of the permit as less than a condition precedent for
permit issuance lends creditability to Consolidation Coal's position that it should be
afforded an opportunity to challenge the "great weight" yet nonconclusive state recom-
mendation.
537 F.2d at 1239.
22 W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-15 (a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides: "Any person adversely
affected by an order made and entered by the chief in accordance with the provisions
of. . . [the Water Pollution Control Act] . . .may appeal to the water resource board
for an order vacating or modifying such order .. " The West Virginia Attorney-
General's opinion, dated November 24, 1975, advised the Water Resources Board that
state certification of a NPDES permit did not qualify as "an order made by the Chief."
537 F.2d at 1238.
2 W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-16 (a) (1973).
537 F.2d at 1239, citing Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The Fourth Circuit's holding does not require
hearings in both a state and federal forum. In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d
485 (4th Cir. 1973), the court established that due process necessitated only one ade-
quate hearing. Appalachian involved EPA pproval of state clean air plans under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (c)(2)(a) (1970). The state had conducted extensive
evidentiary hearings before submission of its plan to the EPA for approval. 477 F.2d
at 502. The court held that the EPA Administrator could have extended sufficient due
process to interested parties if he had adequately reviewed the state hearings. 477 F.2d
at 504. The Fourth Circuit held that the record of the EPA proceeding which included
a thorough review of the state hearing should be certified to the court in order to
determine the adequacy of the due process extended to Appalachian Power. 477 F.2d
at 507-08. Thus, in Consolidation Coal, a state hearing could have afforded adequate
due process to the plaintiff if the Administrator had utilized the state hearing record
in making his administrative decision.
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son, who may suffer a loss, some essential safeguards for fair adminis-
trative judgment.24 Due process protects an individual from an arbi-
trary deprivation of property and liberty rights by affording that
person a right to present his objections to the administrative agency.
Presumably, an agency informed of all opposing positions will
thereby be able to consider all relevant factors necessary to make an
equitable decision.2" In Consolidation Coal, no opportunity was ex-
tended to the company for a presentation of its objections to the
abbreviated permit period. Therefore, the court had no difficulty in
finding a denial of due process.
Due process is, however, a flexible concept and the procedural
safeguards extended to agency actions necessarily vary with the im-
portance of the particular interest involved.27 These safeguards do not
necessarily include full evidentiary hearings, but rather turn on the
substantive basis of the challenge to the agency action. 8 The Fourth
Circuit, in Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency,,29 identified three criteria for measurement of the necessity
for a public hearing: the substantive importance of the issue, the
possible adverse individual impact of the action, and the complexity
of the pleadings." In Appalachian, the court found that all three
24 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). The Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), declared:
"For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been
clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. . .'." 407 U.S.
at 80, citing Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). Although no NPDES
permit cases have been decided challenging the traditional due process requirement,
an analogy can be drawn with other license issuance proceedings. Cf. Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (hearing required when bar ad-
mittance denied); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (hearing required for
denial of liquor license); Bennett v. Board of Public Welfare, 95 Ariz. 170, 388 P.2d
166 (1966) (hearing required when license to operate child care center denied); Milligan
v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1963) (hearing
required for denial of drugstore license). See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsp §§
17.18-17.19 (1970 Supp.). See generally Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Func-
tion Rulemaking Under the APA, 71 MicH. L. REv. 222 (1972); Sinaiko, Due Process
Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF, L. REV. 886 (1975).
2 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
2' See Sinaiko, Due Process Rights of Participation in Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886, 888 (1975).
' Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79 (1975). See Hubel v. West Virginia Racing
Comm., 513 F.2d 240, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1975). See generally Wright, The Courts and
Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
21 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
2' 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). See note 23 supra.
1o Id. at 501.
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factors combined to require evidentiary hearings prior to state imple-
mentation of federal ambient air quality standards.3 ' However, when
these three elements are not adequately raised by an agency action,
courts have held that an agency may properly develop an adequate
record through the use of discovery mechanisms" which would ob-
viate the requirement for a hearing before a federal agency.? Simi-
larly, where the issue presented would not be enhanced or developed
by the receipt of any evidence, no hearing is required.3 4 Due process
extended to an individual may thus vary from a summary proceeding
to an exacting procedure judicial in scope."
The Fourth Circuit, in Consolidation Coal, granted a hearing
without identifying the complex nature, individual impact, or sub-
stantive importance of the permit duration issue which necessitated
the hearing.36 This omission in the opinion seemingly creates an abso-
lute right to an EPA hearing whenever the duration of a permit is
challenged and no state review is obtainable." This holding departs
from the established practice of identifying those elements which
compel the court to require an evidentiary hearing or to remand the
issue to the agency for a determination of other lesser due process
safeguards appropriate for the challenged issue.3 9
3' Id. at 501-02.
2 In Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the
court identified some of these discovery mechanisms as the permit application, affida-
vits, exhibits, and intervention petitions. 414 F.2d at 1129.
" See Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 255 (D.C. Cir.
1970); National Air Carriers Ass'n. v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
1, City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Gulf
State Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
31 Note, Administrative Law - Constitutional Law - Due Process - Social Security
Recipient's Right to an Oral Evidentiary Hearing Prior to a Reduction of Benefits, 22
WAYNE L. Rav. 843, 845-46 (1976).
' 537 F.2d at 1239.
3' The summary treatment of the duration issue raised by Consolidation Coal
leaves to conjecture whether any particular factor gave rise to the hearing requirement.
Future applicants challenging an abbreviated durational permit may argue that this
Fourth Circuit opinion removes any requirement of showing special circumstances
which give rise to a need for a full evidentiary hearing.
31 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1973).
3' International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649-50 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (remanded to EPA for further development of basis for decision concerning
"available technology" for suspension of the 1975 automobile emission standards);
Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (re-
manded to FCC for further development of the record either by discovery mechanisms
or "full-dress" evidentiary hearing to determine whether radio station's license renewal
was proper).
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Consolidation Coal, although susceptible to this expansive inter-
pretation, can be reconciled with the traditional accommodation of
competing governmental and private interests 0 under two theories.
First, the "hearing" granted by the Fourth Circuit can be liberally
interpreted to include simply the comprehensive assembly of the evi-
dentiary record and an informal review before the EPA." Under such
an interpretation, Consolidation Coal merely provides that the EPA
cannot refuse to amass an ample record which would enable it to
assess the merits of the controversy raised by the complaining party.
The court's opinion should not therefore be read as a grant of an
absolute right to a formal hearing upon submission of a challenge to
permit duration. Rather, the decision affirms the principle that any
party adversely affected by administrative action is constitutionally
entitled to an opportunity for a meaningful presentation of his objec-
tion. 2
Second, the court's summary grant of a hearing can be limited to
the facts of the case. Consolidation Coal was denied a hearing before
any forum and was forced to pursue protection of its due process
rights through an extended judicial proceeding which lasted longer
than the challenged two year permit. 3 This denial of a basic constitu-
tional right, which forced Consolidation Coal to operate its mine
under a restricted permit, might itself justify the Fourth Circuit's
grant of a full evidentiary hearing.
Either interpretation of Consolidation Coal averts a result which
could only expend valuable EPA resources affording an evidentiary
40 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
11 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-69 (1951);
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Fourth Circuit in
Appalachian Power cited with approval the Holm court's statement: "The kind of
procedure required must take into account the kind of questions involved." 477 F.2d
at 501. Thus, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that not all questions presented to an
agency necessitate full evidentiary hearings. See generally Cramton, A Comment on
Trial Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585 (1972).
,2 This interpretation of Consolidation Coal conforms to the EPA regulations con-
cerning the agency procedure for granting permit hearings. 40 C.F.R. § 125.36 (c)(1)
(1976) provides:
Written [sic] ten (10) days following the expiration of the time al-
lowed . . . for submitting a request for an adjudicatory hearing, the
Regional Administrator shall grant the request and shall promptly
assign the matter for hearing if he determines that the submitted
request: ... sets forth material issues of fact relevant to the questions
of whether a permit should be issued, denied or modified.
,3 The permit application was submitted in April 1973 and a hearing was not
finally granted until after the Fourth Circuit decision in July 1976. See note 9 supra.
